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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to test the impact of passive and active ownership 
on total shareholder return (TSR) and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score 
of firms. The motivation behind the study is the rise in passive investing over the last few 
decades and the concern that passive owners are not able to engage sufficiently with 
management of the companies they are invested in.  
This study hypothesized that firms that are actively controlled have high TSR and 
higher ESG scores than firms that are passively controlled. The hypothesis was supported 
by the reasoning that passive owners lack the incentives and resources to monitor their 
holdings, and that they cannot use the threat of exit to provoke corporate management to 
act in their best interest. 
This study finds empirical evidence that passive controlling ownership has a 
positive impact on companies’ one-year total shareholder return. Being passively 
controlled was found to increase a firm’s one-year TSR by 6.94 percent compared to not 
being controlled. No significant relationships between controlling ownership and ESG 
score were found.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Background 
In 1976, a concept that revolutionized the financial markets was created by John 
Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group. The concept was named the “index fund,”1 a low 
cost, passively managed fund that tracks the market and allows investors to profit from its 
inevitable long-term success. The index fund emerged from investors’ sentiments of 
disappointment in actively managed funds, which were characterized by buying and 
selling companies based on their predicted performance. Investors were frustrated, 
believing that actively managed funds failed to produce sufficient returns despite their 
high fees (Culloton 2011).  
Bogle’s first passive fund, the index fund VFINX, was created to follow the U.S. 
large cap S&P 500 Index. Today, the Vanguard Group is one of the largest index 
investors in the world. Over 5,000 passive funds make up over a third of assets held in 
the U.S. financial market, while assets bought and sold by active investment managers 
still hold the remaining two thirds (Hunnicutt 2017). The passive funds currently 
available track a wide range of investments, including countries, sectors, industries, small 
cap stocks, and benchmarks. More funds are created constantly, such as BlackRock’s 
recently announced exchange traded funds that exclude gun manufacturing and selling 
companies (Kerber 2018). In the last decade, passive funds have seen growth of about 
60% as investors flock to them for low fee, low maintenance investing. Moody’s 
Investors Service Inc. predicts that passive fund assets will surpass actively managed 
                                                          
1 Because most passively managed funds track indices, the term “index funds” in this study will be used 
interchangeably with “passive funds.” 
2 
assets by 2024 (Marriage & Pooley 2017). There is no question that passive index funds 
have allowed more people to benefit from equity markets, but we must consider the 
potential risks to their growing success. 
 
Motivation  
With its recent and projected growth as a percentage of assets held in the U.S., it 
is necessary to consider the implications of the rise of the passive fund on financial 
markets. One of the primary concerns with passive investing, and the one this study will 
address, is whether passive funds are able to adequately engage their ownership 
responsibilities with corporate management2 of the companies they are invested in. Index 
fund owners such as Fidelity, Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street Global Advisors 
cannot buy or sell index investments based on events that could trigger stock price 
changes. These giant index owners do not have the financial leverage that active owners 
do. They cannot sell a company’s stock if, for example, its practices become unethical, 
board composition puts it at risk, or an unfavorable merger deal is agreed upon. As Rakhi 
Kumar, head of stewardship for State Street Global Advisors, writes, “Index investing is 
like a marriage where divorce is not an option” (Kapadia 2017). Corporate management 
knows that passive owners cannot exit the holding, and this could lead them to make 
riskier decisions.  
The counter-argument is that passive investors are more inclined to take an active 
ownership strategy in the companies they hold because they cannot disinvest, and are 
                                                          
2 “Management” refers to the executive corporate leadership, such as the chief executive officer or chief 
operating officer. Active or passive managers, or investors, are institutions that invest and manage money 
on behalf of clients, such as BlackRock. “Owners” refers to the individuals or institutions who own the 
money that active or passive managers invest. See Appendix A.  
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concerned for the long-term performance of their investments. In BlackRock’s annual 
letter to CEOs, Larry Fink asks that the companies held by BlackRock’s clients create a 
long-term strategy and show how they make “a positive contribution to society” (Fink 
2018). Regarding the concern that passive investors are less engaged in the companies 
they hold, Fink writes: 
In managing our index funds, however, BlackRock cannot express its 
disapproval by selling the company’s securities as long as that company 
remains in the relevant index. As a result, our responsibility to engage and 
vote is more important than ever. In this sense, index investors are the 
ultimate long-term investors – providing patient capital for companies to 
grow and prosper. 
Fink, CEO of the largest asset manager in the world, realizes the challenges 
passive investors face, and he asserts that BlackRock engages actively. However, there 
has been backlash; active investor Dick Weil published an op-ed in early March of 2018 
titled Passive Investors, Don’t Vote, arguing that BlackRock lacks incentive to “cast 
informed votes.” This piece, which was published in the Wall Street Journal, went on to 
explain that passive investors only engage with the companies they hold to appease the 
SEC. Michelle Edkins, head of stewardship BlackRock, responded a few weeks later with 
an op-ed titled, All Share Owners Should Vote Their Stocks. She stressed Fink’s point that 
BlackRock is a leader in engagement, and that all investors should be active owners.  
There are additional concerns that because passive investors hold hundreds of 
companies, it is unlikely they have the resources or incentive to monitor them. The lack 
of incentive argument stems from the idea that passive investors are only concerned with 
4 
the performance of the larger index, not the individual companies within it. Passive 
investors’ lack of financial leverage over the companies they own, and lack of resources 
and incentives to monitor corporate management, could become problematic – 
particularly when they are a controlling owner in a company (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 
2015).  
 
Purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is to attempt to answer the question of whether passive 
owners engage enough with the companies they hold to ensure proper decision making in 
the best interest of shareholders. It tests whether passively controlled companies 
underperform or outperform actively controlled companies in total shareholder return 
(TSR) and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score. By considering both 
shareholder return and ESG score, my analysis measures shareholder value by weighing 
both financial and ESG performance.3 
 
Hypotheses 
This paper seeks to empirically test how passive or active controlling ownership 
may affect total shareholder return and ESG score of firms by constructing the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis One  
• Alternative Hypothesis: Active controlling ownership increases the total shareholder 
return of companies. 
                                                          
3 These are often related. Greater ESG performance has been found to increase financial performance of 
companies (Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015).  
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• Null Hypothesis: Active ownership does not increase the total shareholder return of 
companies. 
Hypothesis Two 
• Alternative Hypothesis: Active controlling ownership increases the ESG score of 
companies. 
• Null Hypothesis: Active ownership does not increase the ESG score of companies. 
Hypothesis Three 
• Alternative Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership decreases the total shareholder 
return of companies. 
• Null Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership does not decrease the total shareholder 
return of companies. 
Hypothesis Four  
• Alternative Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership decreases the ESG score of 
companies. 
• Null Hypothesis: Passive controlling ownership does not decrease the ESG score of 
companies. 
The hypotheses derive from the observation that passive managers, compared to 
active managers, have less financial leverage, less resources, and potentially less 
incentive to monitor their companies (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2015). Therefore, their 
shareholder voice may be limited, and they may not be able to encourage management to 
act in the best interest of shareholders as effectively as active owners can. 
 
6 
Organization of Paper 
The study will move from the introduction and background section to a literature 
review of research done on the topic of passive and active ownership and ESG factors’ 
relationship with company performance. It will discuss how this paper contributes to 
existing literature, and then move to an explanation of the model, dataset, and variables. 
Next, it will discuss the analysis, results, and interpretation of findings. Finally, the 
conclusion will summarize the paper and discuss the implications of the findings, as well 
as discuss drawbacks and opportunities for future improvements. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Overview of Existing Literature 
Although many heated, emotionally driven op-eds have been published on the 
effect of passive investing, there has been little academic research done comparing active 
and passive ownership impact on total shareholder return or ESG performance of 
companies. However, there is literature to support the reasoning behind my hypotheses. 
There are many studies on the link between ESG and financial performance, and a paper 
by Friede, Busch, and Bassen (2015) aggregates the results of 2,000 studies. Additional 
research that will be discussed in the literature review includes investor use of the threat 
of exit as a method of engagement, whether institutional investors prefer choosing short-
term returns or long-term strategies, the success of short-term versus long-term strategies, 
and what factors drive stock prices. 
The first study to address the relationship between passive ownership and 
corporate governance, which is a component of ESG, was titled Passive Investors, Not 
Passive Owners. Authors Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) acknowledged the extensive 
research done on the institutional investor impact on corporate governance, but recognize 
the lack of studies on specifically passive institutions. They state that their study 
contributes to the research “by focusing on passive institutions—a previously ignored, 
but increasingly important, set of institutional investors” (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 
2015). 
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Impact of Passive and Active Ownership 
In their paper Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, Appel, Gormley, and Keim 
(2015) write that there is “surprisingly little analysis of passive institutions like 
Vanguard, State Street, and DFA,” which they say represent an increasingly large part of 
the U.S. stock market. They assume that the reason for the lack of study is the general 
presumption that passive firms do not have the motive or resources to invest in improving 
the governance of the hundreds of companies that they hold. 
The purpose of the research done by Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) was to 
identify if passive investors purposefully engage with firm governance to improve 
performance. The study began with the suspicion that, “the growth of passive investors 
weakens the governance of firms.” This hypothesis was built on the reasoning that: 1) the 
incentive for passive investors to influence management is small because, unlike active 
investors, they simply follow a benchmark’s performance; 2) passive investors lack the 
lever of power over management that active investors have – the ability to sell their 
position in the company if management does act in their best interest; and 3) because they 
are invested in so many companies, passive investors likely lack the resources to 
influence the governance of individual companies.  
The analysis found that the growth of passive funds seems to, “on average, have a 
positive impact on long-term firm-level performance and value.” The authors came to 
this conclusion through finding that passive ownership is associated with key indicators 
of a governance-healthy company: more independent directors, more removals of tactics 
to prevent hostile takeovers (called “poison pills,”), more shareholder freedom to call 
meetings, and less instances of dual class share structures.  
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Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015) hypothesized that, contrary to their initial 
suspicions, passive investors have the incentive to be involved in the governance of the 
companies they hold because they cannot sell their positions. This is the same argument 
provided by BlackRock CEO, Larry Fink, in his 2018 letter to CEOs. 
This study differs from my analysis because it examines specific governance 
issues, and does not address the relationship between passive ownership and overall ESG 
performance or shareholder return.  
 
The Relationship Between ESG and Firm Performance 
Friede, Busch, and Bassen (2015) suggest that interest in the relationship between 
financial performance and ESG began in the 1970s, and that more than 2000 studies on 
the issue have been published since then. Roughly 90 percent of studies find a positive 
relationship between ESG and financial performance. This study is the most complete 
collection of academic research on ESG and financial performance, and therefore “allows 
for generalizable statements” (Friede, Busch, and Bassen 2015). 
Although total shareholder return is not the same as the performance of a 
company, it is often positively correlated with performance. Like the results reported by 
Friede, Busch, and Bassen (2015), I expect to find in my analysis that ESG score is 
positively related to TSR. 
 
The Threat of Exit 
Research by Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) examines the effect of the 
threat of exit, which is a tool investors use to leverage their desired change in the firm, on 
stock price. The effects of threat of exit is difficult to measure, as it is not as quantifiable. 
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Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) work around this by using the principle that the 
threat of exit is weaker when stock liquidity is lower and stronger when it is higher. They 
shocked liquidity using natural financial crises, and found that firms with large 
shareholders (referred to as “blockholders” in the study) suffered greater declines in value 
during crisis periods.  
Because of this evidence that firms with large shareholders are more sensitive to 
the threat of exit, Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar’s (2013) study informs my research on 
controlling shareholders. My hypothesis states that controlling passive shareholders 
create less firm value than large active shareholders in part due to the threat of exit. 
Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) do not differentiate between passive and active 
owners, but it is active owners that support their conclusion that firms with large 
shareholders are more sensitive to the threat of exit. 
Passive investors cannot use the threat of exit as a form of engagement. 
Therefore, passive controlling shareholders’ inability to use this form of voice prevents 
them from having access to the full engagement toolbox that active investors do.  
 
Short-Term Earnings Over Long-Run Value? 
Advocates for good corporate governance and ESG impact often complain that 
investors favor short-term gain, which they believe sacrifices attention to issues like 
board composition and environmental impact. A study by Brian Bushee (2010) seeks to 
answer the question of whether institutional investors prefer short-term earnings over 
long-run value. Bushee’s work found that institutions with short investment horizon 
overweight short-term earnings expectations. With short-term focused investors 
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pressuring firms to perform in the short-run, it may become difficult for companies to 
adopt a long-term view. 
Barton, et al. (2017) examined the impact of companies adopting a long-term 
view on performance. The researchers found that companies focused on the long-term 
had significantly stronger financial performance and fundamentals, as well as social 
returns that “were equally impressive,” according to Bower and Paine (2017).  
Active owners may be either short-term or long-term investors, but by their very 
nature, all passive investors are long-term investors because they cannot disinvest.  If 
passive owners do engage with the companies they invest in, they likely advocate for best 
long-term practices to align with their time horizon. Long-term strategies are found to 
increase financial and social performance, which could indicate that – if they are 
engaging – passive ownership could be associated with greater TSR and ESG score. 
However, because my analysis uses one-year TSR, it could be picking up on short-term 
only performance. 
 
Factors that drive stock price 
Total shareholder return (TSR) measures the return on an equity investment from 
changes in stock price plus dividends. TSR is used, along with ESG, in my study as a 
measure of a publicly held company’s performance. In addition to ownership type, there 
are many forces that influence stock price and therefore TSR. Not all factors were 
captured in my study. 
The stock price of a company changes when investors buy or sell it. It reflects 
investor sentiment. It is often difficult to determine what factors are influencing investor 
sentiment, at a given point in time, which is why speculative traders frequently lose 
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money in the stock market. Economic factors, investor sentiment, industry performance, 
and company performance can all affect stock price, but the level at which they do so 
varies over time, across countries, and between companies. 
A study by Sharif, Purohit, and Pillai (2015) found that firm specific factors such 
as return on equity, book value per share, earnings per share, dividend per share, dividend 
yield, price earnings, and debt to assets drive stock price in the Bahrain Stock market. 
However, there are external forces that also contribute to prices. Peiró (2016) found that 
throughout recent decades, industrial production and long-term interest rates have caused 
over half of stock price movement in France, Germany and the United Kingdom, but the 
weight of influence has changed from interest rates to production. 
Qin and Singal’s (2015) study, Indexing and Stock Price Efficiency, directly 
examines the relationship between passive investing and stock price efficiency. Using a 
large sample of U.S. stocks, they found that companies that were more indexed had less 
stock price efficiency. This study also found evidence that indexing creates the negative 
externality of stock price inefficiency. The researchers make this conclusion through 
finding that stock prices vary more after earnings announcements and increasingly 
deviate from the random walk. They hypothesize that the reason for price inefficiency is 
greater opportunity for arbitrage; increased indexing makes informed and reactive trading 
on the market more lucrative.  
DeLisle, French, and Schutte (2017) further find a negative relation between 
passive ownership and the ability to predict earnings, which they use as a proxy for 
investor knowledge. Index investing does not react to earnings or market changes, and its 
rise provides greater opportunity for active traders to profit as their market influence 
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increases relatively. Stock price inefficiency reduces total shareholder return; therefore, 
Qin and Singal (2015) provide evidence for my hypothesis that passive investing creates 
lower total shareholder return. 
 
Contributions to Literature 
My analysis will contribute to research conducted on the impact of passive 
ownership by addressing, for the first time, the effect of passive ownership on TSR and 
ESG performance. The analysis of Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015), Passive Investors, 
Not Passive Owners, focused on governance specific issues, and it provided useful 
background for the reasoning of my hypotheses. My study provides a broader 
examination of the effects of passive ownership than Appel, Gormley, and Keim’s (2015) 
by adding environmental and social considerations, and examining its effect on total 
shareholder return. 
14 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
 
 
 
Model and Expected Results 
The purpose of the analysis is to examine the effect of ownership type on total 
shareholder return (TSR) and the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) score of 
publicly-traded companies. The ownership types considered are active controlled, passive 
controlled, and not controlled. Because every company is categorized into one of these 
ownership classes, the regression analysis requires that one of the categories is omitted 
from the model. The omitted category is “not controlled.” When interpreting the results, 
the estimated coefficients corresponding to the variables of active and passive controlled 
are, therefore, interpreted relative to the omitted category “not controlled.” 
We expect to find that actively controlled companies have higher TSR and ESG 
score relative to companies that are not controlled. Therefore, we expected that the 
Active Controlled variable would have a positive and statistically significant effect in 
both models. We also expected to find that being passively controlled has a negative 
effect on TSR and ESG score relative to the omitted category, “not controlled.”  Two 
linear regressions were run, one with One Year TSR as the dependent variable and the 
other with ESG Score as the dependent variable.  
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Data and Variables 
The dataset used in the analysis was obtained from MSCI ESG Research, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of MSCI, Inc. MSCI is a global investment research firm that 
provides indices and research, including governance and risk data, primarily to 
institutional investors. The data set contains information on 2,189 companies across the 
eleven Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors. The GICS system was 
developed in 1999 by MSCI and S&P Global. The dataset contains ESG, governance, and 
controversy score variables created by MSCI’s research teams. All data was gathered or 
updated in 2017. 
The data was cleaned and organized in Microsoft Excel. Much of the data was 
converted from text to numerical values so that it could be analyzed. For example, sectors 
were listed as text under one column. I separated each sector into individual columns and 
set them as dummy variables. ESG scores were converted from letters A through E to 
numbers 0 through 5. Additionally, outliers and missing values were identified and 
removed. Regressions were run using Stata, a statistical software used primarily by 
economists. 
The following table contains the description, number of observations, mean, 
standard deviation, and range of all variables used in the two models: 
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Table 1: A descriptive table of variables used in the analysis. *Starred variables were omitted from the 
regressions. 
Dependent Variables 
Total Shareholder Return (TSR). One-year TSR is the other dependent variable in 
this study. The dataset contains TSR variables for returns over one-year, three-year, and 
five-year returns. TSR is expressed as a percentage, “measures the gain in a company’s 
Variable Name Description Observations Mean Standard Deviation Range
Dependent Variables
One-Year TSR Total shareholder return over 2017. 2,318 18.209 45.079 -87.5 - 437.7
ESG Score Environmental, social, and governance score of company, given  by MSCI. 2,317 1.633 0.931 0 - 5
Independent Variables
Ownership Type
Active Controlled If company is owned over 30%  by an active manager. 2,318 0.045 0.208 0 - 1
Passive Controlled If company is owned over 30% by an passive manager. 2,318 0.135 0.342 0 - 1
Not Controlled* If company is not held 30% or more by one shareholder. 2,318 0.818 0.386 0 - 1
Sectors
Consumer Discretionary Firms that produce non-essential consumer goods and services. 2,318 0.147 0.354 0 - 1
Financials Firms that provide financial services to commercial and retail customers. 2,318 0.167 0.373 0 - 1
Information Technology Firms that create applications, operating 
systems and computer components.
2,318 0.149 0.356 0 - 1
Utilities Firms such as electric, gas and water firms, and integrated providers. 2,318 0.031 0.175 0 - 1
Industrials Firms that manufacture machinery, hand-held tools and industrial products. 2,318 0.140 0.347 0 - 1
Health Care
Firms that provide  medical services, 
manufacture equipment or drugs, or 
provide medical insurance.
2,318 0.138 0.345 0 - 1
Real Estate Typically REITs of residential, commercial, and industrial real estate. 2,318 0.074 0.261 0 - 1
Materials Firms that discover, develop, and process raw materials. 2,318 0.050 0.218 0 - 1
Energy Firms involved in producing or supplying energy. 2,318 0.050 0.218 0 - 1
Telecommunications Global communication firms, including internet providers. 2,318 0.011 0.103 0 - 1
Consumer Staples* Firms that produce essential consumer goods and services. 2,318 0.042 0.201 0 - 1
Other
Multiple Share Classes If a firm issues multiple classes of voting shares. 2,318 0.109 0.312 0 - 1
Governance Score Governance score of company on a 1-10 scale, given by MSCI 2,317 5.032 1.430 0 - 8.9
Controversy Score Controversy score of company on a 1-10 scale, given by MSCI 2,318 8.038 2.791 0 - 10
Log Market Cap The logarithmic transformation of market capitalization of company. 2,317 9.485 0.631 7.802 - 11.904
Table 1: Variables
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share price over time, plus any dividends paid, and assuming that those dividends were 
reinvested” (MSCI ESG Research 2017). It reflects the market’s valuation of the 
company’s performance. It is usually used as a “long term indicator of the comparative 
success the company has achieved by creating value for its shareholders in the 
competitive market” (Shah and Sengupta n.d.). 
In the analysis, one-year TSR variable was used due to excessive missing values 
in the three and four-year variables. The 47 companies with missing one-year TSR values 
were removed from the dataset. There were four values that held one-year TSR equal to 
0, and these were left in the dataset.  
 
Figure 1: A histogram of total shareholder return percentages.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of one-year TSR vales for 2,189 companies. The 
histogram shows that the one-year TSR values are skewed to the right, and the skew 
statistic is 38.286. 99.957 percent of the observations are in the first bin. The spread is 
from -87.500 percent to 5,309.080 percent, and the center is 20.491 percent. To identify 
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companies that are outliers in terms of one-year TSR, I looked for values that are more 
than three times the magnitude of the interquartile range (i.e. the difference between the 
third and first quartile) above the third quartile. The maximum value of 5,309 percent is 
44.544 standard deviations above the mean, and this observation was removed from the 
dataset due to suspicion that it was miscoded. Although another 104 companies were 
found to be outliers above the upper bound and 25 companies were outliers below the 
lower bound, these values were left in the data because they appear to be correctly 
measured data points. 
 
Figure 2: A histogram of total shareholder return without outlier of 5,309.080 percent. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of one-year TSR after the outlier with a value of 
5,309.080 percent, is removed. The distribution is still skewed to the right, but the skew 
statistic is 2.901, which is substantially lower than the original value. The spread is from -
87.500 percent to 437.700 percent, and the center is 18.210 percent.  
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Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Score. The ESG score, another 
product of MSCI, is one of the two dependent variables used in this study. The variable is 
measured on a scale of 0-5, with the scores falling on integers. ESG stands for 
environmental, social, and governance, and is a popular term to describe how well a 
company is performing in these areas. Environmental concerns include carbon emissions 
or waste disposal, social issues include worker pay and diversity, and governance is the 
system by which companies are directed by the board. Governance reflects the 
relationship between management and owners, with a good governance system reflecting 
the rights and wishes of owners and holding management accountable.  
To create the score, MSCI ESG Research collects public data such as government 
and NGO datasets and company disclosure documents, and the ESG corporate 
communications team engages with companies to verify data. MSCI then weights certain 
ESG issues – called the Weighted Average Key Issue Score –  relative to industry peers 
to create the final rating (MSCI ESG Research n.d.). 
 
Figure 3: A histogram of the ESG score variable. 
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of ESG scores in the data. The data is most 
heavily concentrated on a 2 ESG score, with 1,282 companies falling into this score. The 
distribution skews to the right with a skew statistic of 1.156.  
Independent Variables 
Ownership type. The three independent variables of primary interest are Active 
Controlled, Passive Controlled, and Not Controlled. They are each dummy variables, 
with a value of 1 if true and 0 if not true. Actively controlled companies are defined as 
those whose largest shareholder owns 30 percent or more of the firm and are founder or 
family owned, or not owned by BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, or State Street. Passively 
controlled companies are defined as those whose largest shareholder owns 30 percent or 
more of the firm, and that shareholder is either BlackRock, Fidelity, Vanguard, or State 
Street. This classification was determined by the reality that, “Vanguard, BlackRock, and 
State Street together control three-quarters of all the money in passive funds” (Kapadia 
2017). It is not a precisely accurate classification, but it is close enough for the purposes 
of this analysis. 
“Not controlled” companies are defined as not being held at 30 percent or more 
by a single shareholder. The majority of companies, 1,896, are not controlled, 104 are 
passively controlled, and 315 are actively controlled. 
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Figure 4: The number of companies within each type of controlling ownership. 
Out of the 104 passively controlled companies, 44 percent are in the Real Estate 
sector. A study by Sebastian Mercado (2015), Chief Strategist at Deutsche Bank, also 
found that real estate was the largest passively owned sector in 2014. A concern is that 
real estate investment trusts (REITs), a large part of the Real Estate sector, are unique in 
their legal requirements for ownership structure. It is required by law that, “five or fewer 
individuals cannot own more than 50 percent of the value of the REIT's stock during the 
last half of its taxable year” (Nareit n.d.). Therefore, it is a concern that a large proportion 
of the 46 passively controlled Real Estate companies are REITs.   
 Among the 315 actively controlled companies, 26 percent are in the Consumer 
Discretionary sector. Figure 5 shows the number of passively and actively controlled 
companies across all sectors: 
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Figure 5: The number of actively and passively controlled companies by sector. 
Log of Market Capitalization. Market capitalization is the total dollar value of a 
company's shares outstanding. Companies with small market capitalizations usually have 
a more volatile stock price than companies with large market capitalizations. They may 
see much higher or lower one-year TSR. Additionally, governance practices have been 
found to be worse on average at small-capitalization firms (Rutherford & Martin 2013). 
This may be reflected in the model that includes market capitalization’s impact on ESG 
score.   
Because there were a few high outliers that skewed the data, the log of market 
capitalization was generated and used in place of the raw values. It is a common 
transformation of the market capitalization variable, and this approach was taken by 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2015).  
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the raw market capitalization of all companies: 
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Figure 6: Distribution of raw market cap variable. 
The shape of the raw market capitalization histogram is skewed heavily right, 
with a skew statistic of 10.200. 97.280 percent of the data is in the first bin. The spread is 
from $.634 billion to $802.160 billion, and the center is $11.886 billion. 
The following figure is a distribution of market capitalization of the companies 
after the log transformation: 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of log transformation of market cap variable. 
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The shape of the log-transformed market cap distribution is normal with a slight 
skew to the right. The skew statistic is .672, the spread is from 7.802 to 11.904, and the 
center is 9.485.  
GICS Sectors. The eleven Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors 
- Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Health Care, 
Industrials, Information Technology, Materials, Real Estate, Telecommunication 
Services, and Utilities - were each dummy variables. Sectors were included as variables 
to attempt to identify sector trends in one-year TSR and ESG performance. The excluded 
sector was consumer staples, which accounts for 4.38 percent of the sample, making it 
one of the smaller sectors considered.  
The Consumer Discretionary sector contains firms that produce non-essential 
consumer goods and services; the Financials sector includes commercial and retail 
customer financial services; the Information Technology sector contains companies that 
create applications, operating systems, and other computer related mechanisms; the 
Utilities sector includes gas and power utilities; the Industrials sector includes machinery 
and industrial tool manufacturing firms; the Health Care sector contains firms that 
provide medical goods and services; the Real Estate sector typically contain REITs of 
residential, commercial, and industrial real estate; the Materials sector discovers, 
develops, and processes raw materials; Energy sector companies produce or supply 
energy; firms in the Telecommunications sector provide global communication; the 
Consumer Staples sector produces essential consumer goods and services (Fidelity 
Investments n.d.). 
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There are a few unique features to note about the Real Estate sector. It was 
recently added to the GICS in 2016. It is largely comprised of real estate investment 
trusts (REITs), which do not behave like typical equities. Their earnings are usually tied 
to long-term contracts, they have to pay at least 90 percent of their income in dividends, 
and they are legally prevented from having five or fewer individuals own more than 50 
percent of the REIT.  
The Health Care sector had the highest average one-year TSR, and the Energy 
sector had the lowest.  
 
Figure 8: Average one-year TSR by sector. 
 The sector average ESG scores were similar, but Real Estate and Health Care had 
the highest average scores and Telecommunications Services had the lowest: 
26 
 
Figure 9: Average ESG score by sector. 
 Sectors varied widely in market capitalization. The three sectors with the largest 
average market capitalization are Telecommunication Services, Consumer Staples, and 
Information Technology with market capitalizations between $17 and $23 billion. The 
sectors with the lowest average market cap are Real Estate and Materials, with market 
capitalizations around $6 billion. 
 
Figure 10: Average market capitalization by sector. 
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Multiple Classes of Voting Stock. Companies with multiple classes of voting 
stock have long been a concern among investors. Dual-class shares made their first 
appearances in the 1980s, and today are worth more than $5 trillion in the capital 
markets. This system contains two or more types of shares, one with full voting rights 
and usually held by insiders, and the other(s) with limited voting rights typically owned 
by public shareholders. The dual-class system has been adopted in situations in which 
management wants to retain ownership control, and SEC commissioner Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr. writes, “you have a structure that undermines accountability: management 
can outvote ordinary investors on virtually anything” (Jackson 2018). 
There are 244 companies with multiple classes of shares and 1,945 without.  
Governance Score. Governance score is an MSCI ESG Research rating on a scale 
between 0-10, with the score increasing as governance quality increases. Governance 
represents the “G” in ESG, and therefore we expected to find correlation between the 
ESG Score and the Governance Score. The correlation was .133, and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) was 1.018. Therefore, we determined there was not 
multicollinearity between the two variables. The standard rule is that a VIF of greater 
than 4 or greater should be investigated, and a VIF exceeding 10 indicates 
multicollinearity (The Pennsylvania State University n.d.).  
Governance score is calculated by combining eleven measures, and incorporates 
factors such as executive compensation, board composition, number of independent 
directors, board diversity, and voting rights.   
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Figure 11: Distribution of Governance Score variable. 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of governance scores. Scores are most highly 
concentrated between 5.340 and 6.230, and the distribution is slightly skewed to the left 
with a skew statistic of -0.489.  
Controversy Score. The MSCI ESG controversy score provides a company rating, 
on a scale of 0-10 with 0 being the most severe controversy, of controversies concerning 
the “negative environmental, social, and/or governance impact of company operations, 
products and services.” This framework is consistent with international standards created 
by the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, and the UN Global Compact (MSCI ESG Research 2017).  
The controversy score was included because it was considered to be a factor that 
influences ESG score and TSR. It considers issues that affect stakeholders such as the 
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environment, customers, and the community. Controversies in these areas are can affect 
stock price and/or ESG performance.  
We expected that there was correlation between the ESG Score and the 
Controversy Score. We found that the correlation was negative, and the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) was 1.005. Therefore, we determined there was not multicollinearity 
between the two variables. 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of controversy score of companies, with the data 
most heavily concentrated on 10, the least severe controversy score. The skew is -1.166, 
and only 95 companies labeled as having the most severe controversy(ies).  
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Controversy Score variable.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
 
Empirical Results and Key Findings 
Before running regressions, a scatterplot was created to attempt to identify 
standout relationships between one-year TSR and ESG score by ownership type. The 
scatterplot shows a positive relationship of .04 between one-year TSR and ESG score 
among passively controlled companies. 
 
Figure 13: ESG score contributing to TSR where red is actively controlled and blue is passively controlled. 
In the first model, the regressions found that passive controlling ownership was 
statistically significant and positively influences one-year TSR. However, active 
controlling ownership was not statistically significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null 
Hypothesis One that active controlling ownership does not have a positive impact on one-
year TSR. Additionally, we cannot reject the null Hypothesis Three that passive 
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ownership has a non-negative impact on one-year TSR. We fail to reject it because the 
Passive Controlled variable was significant and found to positively impact One Year 
TSR.  
In the second model with dependent variable ESG Score, neither active or passive 
controlling ownership were statistically significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null 
Hypothesis Two that active controlling ownership does not have a positive impact on 
ESG score. We also cannot reject the null Hypothesis Four that passive controlling 
ownership has a non-negative impact on ESG score. 
Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis One set out to test whether active controlling ownership increases a 
firm’s total shareholder return. Using a significance level of .05, the statistically 
significant variables were Passive Controlled, ESG Score, Governance Score, Log 
Market Cap, Consumer Discretionary, Utilities, Industrials, Health Care, Materials, and 
Energy because their p-values were less than .05.  
Passive Controlled had a coefficient of 6.939, which indicates that for every one-
unit increase in active ownership, a 6.939 percent increase is predicted in one-year TSR, 
holding all other variables constant. A one-unit increase in ESG Score is predicted to 
increase one-year TSR by 1.924 percent, while a unit increase in Governance Score is 
predicted to decrease one-year TSR by 1.305 percent. A unit increase in Log Market Cap 
is predicted to increase One Year TSR by 14.255 percent. 
Companies in the energy sector have, on average, a negative relationship with 
one-year TSR. However, companies in the consumer discretionary, industrials, utilities, 
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materials, and health care sectors on average correspond with a predicted increase in One 
Year TSR.  
With a raw R-squared value of .099, the variance in the independent variables 
predicts 9.9 percent of the variation in the dependent. This is an overall measure of the 
model’s fit. 
 
Table 2: Regression table of model one (One-Year TSR). 
Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis Two set out to test whether active controlling ownership increases a 
firm’s ESG Score. Using a significance level of .05, the statistically significant variables 
were Governance Score, Controversy Score, Materials, and Telecommunications.  
Source SS df MS Number of obs 2,316.000      
F(17, 2298) 14.870            
Model  466,535.298      17.000               27,443.253  Prob > F -                   
Residual 4,241,502.570   2,298.000         1,845.737    R-squared 0.099              
Adj R-squared 0.092              
Total   4,708,037.870   2,315.000         2,033.710    Root MSE 42.962            
One-Year TSR Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| [95% Confidence Interval]
Active Controlled -7.054 4.561 -1.550 0.122 -15.998 1.891
Passive Controlled 6.939 3.076 2.260 0.024 0.907 12.971
ESG Score 1.924 0.974 1.980 0.048 0.014 3.833
Governance Score -1.305 0.633 -2.060 0.039 -2.547 -0.063
Controversy Score 0.371 0.323 1.150 0.251 -0.262 1.004
Multiple Share Classes -0.581 3.348 -0.170 0.862 -7.147 5.985
Log Market Cap 14.255 1.441 9.890 0.000 11.429 17.080
Consumer Discretionary 13.010 4.954 2.630 0.009 3.295 22.725
Financials 8.204 4.917 1.670 0.095 -1.439 17.847
Utilities 22.179 4.964 4.470 0.000 12.445 31.914
Information Technology 7.040 6.689 1.050 0.293 -6.077 20.156
Industrials 18.423 5.008 3.680 0.000 8.601 28.244
Health Care 30.896 5.037 6.130 0.000 21.019 40.773
Real Estate 3.877 5.578 0.700 0.487 -7.061 14.815
Materials 20.170 5.948 3.390 0.001 8.506 31.834
Energy -13.991 5.960 -2.350 0.019 -25.680 -2.303
Telecommunications 14.730 9.665 1.520 0.128 -4.223 33.682
Constant -131.535 15.446 -8.520 0.000 -161.825 -101.246
Table 2: Regression Analysis 1
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A unit increase in governance score is predicted to increase ESG score by .095 
units, and a unit increase in controversy score is predicted to decrease ESG Score by 
.023. Both Materials and Telecommunications are negatively related to the dependent 
variable, with a unit increase in Materials predicting a .277 score decrease in ESG Score 
and a unit increase in Telecommunications predicting a .415 score decrease in ESG 
Score. 
The raw R-squared value is .032, indicating that the variance in the independent 
variables predicts 3.2 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. The model has 
not done well to identify variables that impact ESG Score. 
 
Table 3: Regression table of model two (ESG Score). 
Source  SS df MS Number of obs 2,316.000      
F(17, 2298) 4.500              
Model  64.752          17.000                 3.809      Prob > F -                  
Residual 1,943.288    2,298.000           0.846      R-squared 0.032              
Adj R-squared 0.025              
Total 2,008.040    2,315.000           0.867      Root MSE 0.920              
ESG Score Coefficient Standard Error t P > |t| [95% Confidence Interval]
Active Controlled -0.049 0.098 -0.500 0.619 -0.240 0.143
Passive Controlled -0.027 0.066 -0.420 0.678 -0.157 0.102
One-Year TSR 0.001 0.000 1.980 0.048 0.000 0.002
Governance Score 0.095 0.013 7.080 0.000 0.069 0.121
Controversy Score -0.023 0.007 -3.400 0.001 -0.037 -0.010
Multiple Share Classes 0.024 0.072 0.330 0.743 -0.117 0.164
Log Market Cap -0.038 0.031 -1.210 0.227 -0.100 0.024
Consumer Discretionary -0.065 0.106 -0.610 0.539 -0.274 0.143
Financials -0.151 0.105 -1.430 0.151 -0.357 0.055
Utilities -0.039 0.107 -0.360 0.717 -0.248 0.171
Information Technology 0.009 0.143 0.070 0.948 -0.271 0.290
Industrials -0.076 0.108 -0.710 0.480 -0.287 0.135
Health Care -0.138 0.109 -1.270 0.203 -0.352 0.075
Real Estate -0.047 0.119 -0.390 0.695 -0.281 0.187
Materials -0.277 0.127 -2.180 0.030 -0.527 -0.027
Energy -0.199 0.128 -1.560 0.118 -0.450 0.051
Telecommunications -0.415 0.207 -2.010 0.045 -0.821 -0.010
Constant 1.793 0.334 5.370 0.000 1.139 2.448
Table 3: Regression Analysis 2
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Hypotheses Three and Four 
 Hypotheses Three and Four were created to test the impact of passive ownership 
on one-year TSR and ESG Score. Null Hypothesis Three was that passive ownership 
does not negatively impact on One-Year TSR, and null Hypothesis Four was that passive 
ownership does not negatively impact ESG Score. We failed to reject the null Hypothesis 
Three because we found empirical evidence that passive ownership positively impacts 
One Year TSR, and we failed to reject the null Hypothesis Four because the results were 
not statistically significant. 
 
Interpretation 
The first hypothesis predicted that active ownership increases total shareholder 
return of firms, but the results showed that, contrarily, being passively controlled 
increases one-year TSR on average. No definitive conclusion could be made about active 
ownership because the results were not significant.  
The second hypothesis predicted that active controlling ownership increases firm 
ESG Score. The analysis did not find significant evidence that either type of ownership 
influences a firm’s ESG performance.  
 
Limitations of the Models 
The biggest limitation in this study was using one-year total shareholder return 
instead of a longer-term measurement, such as five-year TSR. This was done due to the 
quantity of missing values in five-year and three-year TSR data.4 Two possible reasons 
                                                          
4 516 data points were missing in five-year TSR. However, these missing data appeared to be missing at 
random. A regression was run to test the impact of active or passive ownership on five-year TSR. The 
active and passive ownership variables were not found to be significant. 
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for missing data are that the company had an initial public offering less than three years 
prior to the date the data was collected, or that is new in its trading form due to merger 
and acquisition action.  
A disadvantage of using one-year TSR is that it is sensitive to market conditions 
over the year it was measured. 2017 saw the continuation of an unusual bull market that 
began soon after the financial crisis of 2008, and has been the second-longest bull market 
to ever run (Moreano 2016). This will not allow for an analysis of the impact of 
ownership type on TSR that considers all conditions of the market.  Additionally, using a 
one-year TSR measure conflicts with the long-term nature of index investors; their 
engagement goals are long-term and thus will likely not be reflected with a one-year TSR 
measure. This problem may have been alleviated by comparing two one-year TSR 
measures from two points in time, one during a bull market and one during a bear market, 
such as 2007. 
An additional limitation was not including more factors that influence company 
performance, and therefore stock price, in the model as variables. These variables include 
ratios such as return on assets, sales to equity, net income, and others that reflect 
performance and impact value (Peiró 2016). 
In the second model, a concern was that Governance Score and Controversy 
Score would explain much of the variance in the dependent variable and drown out the 
effects of other variables. However, a regression was run without these two independent 
variables, and similar results were found in both the R-squared value and the significance 
of other variables in the model. 
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Finally, ESG Score was used as an independent variable in the first model, and 
One Year TSR was used as an independent variable in the second model. This may have 
caused correlation in error terms.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Summary of Paper 
My analysis sought to determine whether companies with passive controlling 
ownership underperform or outperform firms with active controlling ownership in 
shareholder value. Based on three reasons, I hypothesized that firms with passive 
controlling ownership had lower total shareholder return and worse ESG score. The three 
reasons were that passive owners have less incentive to monitor their holdings, that they 
do not have the resources to do so, and that they cannot use the threat of exit to provoke 
management to act in the best interest of shareholders. 
This thesis finds empirical evidence that passive investing has a positive impact 
on companies’ one-year total shareholder return. No significant relationships between 
controlling ownership and ESG score were found. 
Being passively controlled was found to increase a firm’s One Year TSR by 6.94 
percent compared to not being controlled. This relationship may be a result of 
engagement, as hypothesized, but perhaps more likely it is a result of inflows of investor 
funds into passively managed holdings over actively managed holdings in 2017, as 
“passive funds were heavily favored over active” (Vlastelica 2017). TSR reflects stock 
price, and prices rises when investor money flows into the company.  
 
Discussion and Further Research 
Although this study found empirical evidence that passive controlling ownership 
positively influenced one-year TSR, there were many limitations in this analysis that 
could be amended in further studies. One limitation was using only a one-year TSR 
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measure, which fails to provide a long-term performance measure of companies held by 
passive, or long-term, investors. This could be improved by using one-year TSR 
measures from two different years over a period of time to account for different market 
conditions as well as long-term ownership effects. Another limitation is using only 
controlling owners to determine ownership type. Ideally, we would have used data on all 
owners of the firms to aggregate ownership type and provide a more nuanced measure of 
whether they are passively or actively owned. This would have given us a much larger 
number of passively and actively held companies.  
Further research should be done on the implications of rising passive ownership 
of stocks, and whether engagement by passive owners is adequate to hold corporate 
management accountable to shareholders. 
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